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Many developing countries have embarked on tax reforms in recent years. Such reforms 
were motivated both by local factors as well as by rapid internationalization of economic 
activities. The need to correct fiscal imbalances and the transition from a centralized plan 
to a market economy were the important local factors hastening tax reforms. Difficulties 
in compressing expenditures necessitated that tax system reform take an important role in 
fiscal adjustment strategy. The transition from plan to market required the substitution of 
administered prices with market determined prices, the replacement of physical controls 
with financial controls, and the substitution of public enterprise profits with tax revenues. 
Likewise, tax reforms become imperative in a globalizing environment. Enhancing 
competitiveness and attracting foreign investment require minimizing both efficiency and 
compliance costs of the tax system. Globalization also involves loss of revenue from 
customs, which needs to be replaced with domestic taxes.  
The Indian tax system too had to be reformed in response to changes in 
development strategy. In the initial years, tax policy was used as an instrument to achieve 
a variety of diverse goals which included increasing the level of saving and correcting for 
inequalities arising from an oligopolistic market structure created by a centralized 
planning regime, including a licensing system, exchange control, and administered prices 
(Bagchi and Nayak 1994). While the history of taxation in India is peppered with efforts 
for tax reform, especially in the form of various expert committees, the fiscal crisis of 
1991 provided the first major window of opportunity for a serious rethink, followed by 
action.  
 This paper analyzes both the structure and the operations of the Indian tax system. 
The first section discusses the evolution of the Indian tax system and tax collections and the 
impact of historical and institutional factors in shaping Indian tax policy.  Next, we provide 
a critical analysis of some key features of the tax regime and its reform options. An analysis 
of the observed trends in tax revenue is presented in the following section, highlighting the 
possible efficiency and equity implications of the tax system. The final section pulls together 
the various suggestions for consolidation of tax reforms in India. 
 
Evolution of Indian Tax System 
 
The Assignment System 
 
The assignment of tax powers in the constitution provides the framework for the evolution 
of the tax system in India. It assigns most of the broad-based and mobile tax bases to the 
center. These are taxes on non-agricultural incomes and wealth, corporation tax, customs 
duties, and excise duties on manufactured goods. States’ tax powers include taxes on 
agricultural incomes and wealth, sales taxes, excises on alcohol, taxes on motor vehicles, 
passengers and goods, stamp duties, registration fees on transfer of property, and taxes and 
duties on electricity. Of these, sales tax is the most important and contributes 60 percent of 
states’ tax revenue.  
The evolution of tax policy within the framework of planned development strategy 
had important implications. First, tax policy was directed to raise resources for the public 
sector without regard to efficiency implications. Second, the objective of achieving a 
socialistic pattern of society on the one hand and the attempt to tax large oligopolistic rents 
generated by the system of licenses, quotas, and restrictions on the other, called for a steeply 
progressive tax structure. Third, pursuit of a multiplicity of objectives complicated the tax 
system with adverse effects on both efficiency and horizontal equity. This also opened up 
large avenues for evasion and avoidance of taxes.  Fourth, the above considerations 
complicated the tax system, and selectivity and discretion became a legitimate part of the tax 
policy and administration. Fifth, the influence of special interest groups, changing priorities, 
and lack of information system and scientific analysis led to ad hoc and often inconsistent 
calibration of policies. Finally, poor information system was both the cause of selective 
application of the tax system and its effect. 
    
Recent Trends in Indian Tax Reforms  
 
While India has had a history of periodically assessing the tax structure, through the 
constitution of tax reform committees (India 1971, 1977), actual reform attempts were 
largely ad hoc; it required a crisis of some severity before systematic tax reforms were 
implemented. Fiscal and balance of payments crises of 1991 warranted systematic reform 
not only to improve the revenue productivity of the tax system to phase out fiscal imbalance, 
but also to reorient the tax system to the requirements of a market economy. Tax reforms 
were an integral part of this larger reform initiative.  
The Tax Reforms Committee (India 1991) laid out a framework and a roadmap for 
the reform of direct and indirect taxes as a part of the structural reform process. The 
paradigm shift in tax reforms adopted by the TRC was in keeping with the best practice 
approach of broadening the base, lowering marginal tax rates, reducing rate differentiation, 
simplifying the tax structure, and adopting measures to make the administration and 
enforcement more effective. 
The important proposals put forward by the TRC included reduction in the rates of 
all major taxes, i.e., customs, individual, and corporate income and excise taxes to 
reasonable levels, maintain progressivity but not such as to induce evasion. The TRC 
recommended a number of measures to broaden the base of all the taxes by minimizing 
exemptions and concessions, drastic simplification of laws and procedures, building a 
proper information system and computerization of tax returns, and revamping and 
modernization of administrative and enforcement machinery. It also recommended that the 
taxes on domestic production should be fully converted into a value added tax, and it should 
be extended to the wholesale level, in agreement with the States, with additional revenues 
beyond post-manufacturing stage passed on to the State governments. The tax reforms 
witnessed thereafter sought to follow the directions spelt out in this report. 
While the TRC laid down the analytical foundations for the reform of the tax system 
in a liberalized environment, subsequent reports extended the roadmap for reforms to meet 
the demands of the emerging economic environment in the new millennium. These include 
the task force reports on the reform of direct and indirect taxes (India 2002) and the report of 
the task force on the implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility of Budget Management 
Act, 2003 (India 2004).  
 
 Reform of Direct Taxes 
 
At the central level, the income tax evolved as a principal instrument to bring about 
redistribution until mid 1970s. Thus, in 1973-74, the personal income tax had eleven tax 
brackets with rates monotonically rising from 10 percent to 85 percent. When the surcharge 
of 15 percent was taken into account, the highest marginal rate for persons above Rs. 
200,000 income was 97.5 percent. Combined with the highest wealth tax rate of 5 percent, 
the budget speech for 1971-72 argued that this tax rate would ensure a ceiling on income at 
Rs. 250,000, for purely income from capital alone.  
In the case of company taxation, the classical system of taxation involved the 
taxation of the profits in the hands of the company and the dividends in the hands of the 
shareholders. The distinction was made for widely held companies and different types of 
closely held companies. The tax rate varied from the base rate of 45 percent to 65 percent in 
the case of some widely held companies. Although nominal rates were high, the effective 
rates were substantially lower due to generous tax preferences such as depreciation and 
investment allowance.2   
Tax reforms initiated after 1991-92 attempted to simplify tax rates considerably. The 
number of brackets was reduced to three for personal income tax. In 1992-93, the prescribed 
rates were 20 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent. Financial assets were excluded from 
wealth tax and the maximum marginal rate was reduced to one percent. Further 
simplification was achieved in 1997-98 when the three bracket rates were reduced to 10-20-
30 percent and have remained steady thereafter, with some changes in the associated income 
brackets. The budget for 2005-06 made some major changes in structure by raised the 
exemption limit to Rs. 100,000 and abolishing the provision for standard deduction.3 The 
exemption limit for women and senior citizens was higher respectively at Rs. 135,000 and 
Rs. 185,000. The other major change relates to the amalgamation of provisions under 
various incentive schemes into a blanket cap of Rs. 100,000, made deductible from income. 
This was proposed as a step towards the introduction of an Exempt-Exempt-Tax (EET) 
based system of taxation of savings, investment and income earned.4  Exigencies of revenue 
have led to an additional surcharge of 10 percent of the tax paid and a two percent 
earmarked charge for primary education on all taxes.  
In the case of corporate taxation too, the basic rate was brought down to 50 percent, 
and rates applicable to different categories of closely held companies were unified at 55 
percent. The distinction between closely held and widely held companies was done away 
with and the tax rates were unified at 40 percent in 1993-94. In 1997-98, when personal 
income tax rates were reduced, the company rate was brought down to 35 percent. The 
budget of 2005-06 finally achieved a much needed alignment of the highest marginal tax 
rate in personal income tax with the tax applicable on corporate income tax, thereby 
reducing the corporate income tax rate to 30 percent. This is topped over by a 10 percent 
surcharge, as applicable to personal income tax for income beyond Rs. 1,000,000. On 
dividend tax, there has been a distinct lack of direction. The levy of 10 percent tax on 
dividends was shifted from individuals to companies in 1997-98. The rate of tax was 
increased to 20 percent in 2000-01, reduced again to 10 percent in 2001-02; in 2002-03, the 
levy once again reverted to the shareholders.5 This policy was reversed yet again in 2003-04 
with the levy of the tax on the company, ostensibly to encourage the debt and equity 
markets.  
The system evolved from a high marginal tax rates regime to one of lower rates. 
Generous depreciation provisions and large number of tax preferences in the tax statutes 
sought to cushion the impact of the former regime on taxpayers. The transition to a regime 
with more moderate tax rates has been witness to a scaling down of the investment 
allowance and depreciation provisions. The same cannot, however, be said about the tax 
incentives and preferences. In the case of personal income tax, the Advisory Group on Tax 
Policy and Tax Administration lists the incentives in twenty-five pages of its report (India 
2001a: 125-150). These include incentives and concessions for savings, housing, retirement 
benefits, investment in and returns from certain types of financial assets, investments in 
retirement schemes, and income of charitable trusts. There are a variety of tax preferences 
that have not only distorted the after-tax rates of return on various types of investments in 
unintended ways, but also have significantly eroded the tax base. The major tax preferences 
in the case of corporate tax were investment allowance, accelerated depreciation allowance 
and tax incentives for investment in infrastructure (section 80IA of Income Tax Act), 
housing development(section 80 HHBA of Income Tax Act), for investment in backward 
areas (section 80IC of the  Income Tax Act), on export incomes (sections 10A, 10B, 10BA 
and 80HHC of Income Tax Act), for small units (section 80 HHA of the Income Tax Act), 
for some sunrise industries (Section 10A of the Income Tax Act) and for special economic 
zones (section 80IAB of the Income Tax Act). The budget of 2005-06 seeks to tone down 
the incentives embedded in the depreciation provisions by reducing the rate on general plant 
and machinery to 15 percent from the existing 25 percent cushioned by an increased 
investment allowance, i.e., initial depreciation allowance to 20 percent without 
conditionalities regarding installed capacity increases.  
The wide ranging tax preferences have led to large scale avoidance of the tax by 
companies resulting in several “zero tax” companies. In order to correct this, Minimum 
Alternate Tax (MAT) was imposed since 1997-98, at regular rates of tax on 30 percent of 
book profits. Presently, the liability arises when the tax payable on taxable income 
computed as per the Income Tax Act is less than 7.5 percent of the “book profit” of the 
company. Such a company is subject to a MAT of 7.5 percent of “book profit,” as defined in 
the Income Tax Act. Like regular income tax, this tax is also topped up by a surcharge of 2.5 
percent and a cess (an additional earmarked charge) of 2 percent. The budget for 2006-07 
has raised the MAT rate to 10 percent with provision to provide partial tax credit against 
corporate income tax in subsequent years.6 
The budgets of 2004-05 and 2005-06 saw the introduction of a few more stand alone 
levies ostensibly to plug a few loopholes and garner resources at the same time. The Fringe 
Benefits Tax was introduced as a levy on companies having Indian employees. The tax is 
payable by the company on a part of its expenditures on certain identified items of fringe 
benefits – seventeen such items have been identified, each associated with a number 
defining the extent of tax liability. Interestingly, this tax is over and above the provision for 
taxation of perquisites in the hands of the employee, as a part of the personal income tax 
regime. The second stand-alone levy introduced was a Banking Cash Transactions Tax, 
which was applicable on “large” cash withdrawals from current accounts operated in banks. 
This tax was rationalized on the grounds that it would help track ‘black economy’ 
transactions, by creating a trail. A third such levy is a securities transaction tax, applicable 
on the sale of financial securities on the stock exchanges. This levy was introduced to 
capture a tax on financial transactions and effectively replace an evasion-prone provision for 
capital gains taxation. In the neighborhood of each of these activities, it may appear that the 
solution proposed is an effective one. This, however, results in a proliferation of taxes with 
unknown effects on equity and efficiency. Further, it leaves unanswered the question, 
whether the underlying problems should be addressed head on or whether a local solution 
should be found for every such loophole in the law.  
The most important ongoing reform in recent years is in tax administration. 
Expansion of tax deduction at source (TDS) is one of the significant measures to reach the 
“hard to tax” groups. Further, every individual living in large cities covered under any one 
of six conditions (ownership of house, cars, membership of a club, ownership of credit card, 
foreign travel, and subscriber of a telephone connection) is necessarily required to file the 
tax return.7 The Budget for 2004-05 stipulated mandatory reporting by third parties on 
several high-value transactions which can help to strengthen the information on large 
taxpayers. While the issue of permanent account numbers (PAN) has been simplified by 
outsourcing it to the UTI Investors’ Services Ltd., the work on Tax Information Networking 
(TIN) has been outsourced to the National Securities Depository Ltd. (NSDL). 
Strengthening the information system through the TIN, processing and matching the 
information from various sources on a selective basis is an important initiative that is likely 




Reform of Indirect Taxes 
 
The structure of excise duties by the middle of the 1970s was complex and highly 
distortionary.  The tax structure was a mix of specific and ad valorem taxes, and on the latter 
alone, there were 24 different rates varying from 2 to 100 percent (excluding tobacco and 
petroleum products which were taxed at higher rates).  The report of Indirect Tax Enquiry 
Committee (India, 1977) recommended the conversion of specific duties into ad valorem, 
unification of tax rates and introduction of input tax credit to convert the tax into a 
manufacturing stage value added tax (MANVAT), but it was not implemented until 1986-
87. Not surprisingly, this piecemeal and gradualist approach led to a decline in the tax-GDP 
ratio after reforms. 
Further reform impetus on excise duties came with the implementation of the 
recommendations of the TRC. The measures included gradual unification of rates and 
greater reliance on account based administration. In 1999-2000, almost eleven tax rates were 
merged into three with a handful of “luxury” items subject to two non-VAT additional rates 
(6 and 16 percent). However, specific rates in respect of some commodities continued. 
These were further merged into a single rate in 2000-01 to be called a Central VAT 
(CenVAT), along with three special additional excises (8 percent, 16 percent, and 24 
percent) for a few commodities. Subsequent years have seen stabilization of the primary rate 
of 16 percent, but there continues a proliferation of multiple rates especially below 16 
percent. It should be noted that apart from those that might be built into variations in rates, 




Contrary to the general patterns seen in low-income countries where international trade 
taxes generate the bulk of the revenues, revenue from this source was not very large in the 
initial years of independent India (Chelliah 1986) due to quantitative restrictions on imports. 
Further, high and differentiated tariffs, varying rates with the stage of production (lower 
rates on inputs and higher rates on finished goods), and income elasticity of demand resulted 
in not only high and varying effective rate of protection, but also a premium for inefficiency 
and unintended distortions in the allocation of resources.  
By 1990-91, the tariff structure was highly complex varying from 0 to 400 percent. 
Over 10 percent of imports were subject to more than 120 percent. Wide-ranging 
exemptions granted by issuing notifications made the system complex and was a reflection 
of the influence of various special interest groups on tax policy. The TRC recommended 
reduction in the number and level of tariffs to 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, and 50 percent to be 
achieved by 1997-98. The reform that followed resulted in the reduction in the peak rate 
from over 400 percent to 40 percent by 1997-98 and further on to reach 12.5 percent in the 
budget for 2006-07. However, the pattern of tariffs with the rates varying with the stage of 
processing has continued and this has caused very high effective rates on assembling of 
consumer durable and luxury items of consumption. Along with relaxation of quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exchange rate depreciation, the change in the tariffs constituted a 




An interesting aspect of the assignment system in India is that except in the case of a few 
specified services assigned to the states such as the entertainment tax, the passengers and 
goods tax, and the electricity duty, services were not specifically assigned either to the 
center or to states. This violated the principle of neutrality in taxing consumption as it 
discriminated against goods. As services are relatively more income elastic, the tax system 
was also rendered less progressive. An even more important argument for taxing services is 
to enable a coordinated calibration of a consumption tax system on goods and services, as in 
the production chain services enter into goods and vice-versa. 
The introduction of tax on services at the central level began in 1994-95 with three 
services – namely, non-life insurance, stock brokerage, and telecommunications. The list 
was expanded in succeeding years to include over eighty services at present.8 Although 
initially taxed at 7 percent, the rate was increased to 10 percent in 2002-03 and further to 12 
percent in the budget of 2006-07, with a case for convergence between the goods and 
services tax, where the former is taxed at 16 percent. The Expert Group on Taxation of 
Services (India, 2001b) recommended the extension of the tax to all services along with the 
provision of input tax credit for both goods and services and subsequently, integration with 
the central VAT (CENVAT) on goods. However, while the government has yet to 
implement general taxation of services, input tax credit for goods entering into services and 
vice versa has been extended. Further, the budget for 2006-07 announces an intention to 
introduce a generalized goods and services tax by 2010.  
 
 
State-Level Tax Reforms 
 
Tax reforms at the state level have not coincided with those at the center. While individual 
state governments tried to appoint committees from time to time and reform their tax 
structures, there was no systematic attempt to streamline the reform process even after 1991, 
when market-oriented reforms were introduced. Most of the reform attempts were ad hoc 
and were guided by exigencies of revenue rather than by attempts to modernize the tax 
system. Indeed, systematic studies were commissioned to show their reform orientation, but 
the recommendations were hardly implemented. The pace of tax reforms in the states 
accelerated in the latter half of the 1990s, with increasing pressures on their budgets and, in 
some cases, due to the conditionalities imposed by multilateral lending agencies or to meet 
the targets set by the medium-term fiscal reforms facility. The major landmark in tax reform 
at the state level was the simplification and rationalization of the sales tax system by 
introducing a value-added tax in twenty-one states from April 1, 2005. Subsequently, all 
other states too have switched to this new regime.9 
The VAT reform adopted in April 2005 levies the tax at two rates, namely 4 percent 
and 12.5 percent. Basic necessities are exempted. Petrol and diesel (which contribute about 
40 percent of sales tax) are kept outside the VAT regime and a floor rate on them is fixed at 
20 percent. All dealers up to Rs. 500,000 are exempted. Those with turnover above Rs. 
500,000 but below Rs. 5 million may pay a turnover based tax and remain outside the VAT 
chain unless they voluntarily register and pay the tax at the prescribed rates. All importers 
and manufacturers as well as other dealers with turnover above Rs. 5 million are required to 
pay the VAT at prescribed rates and constitute the chain.  
There are two major limitations of this design: one, it applies only to intra-state 
transactions, and two, it applies only to goods. For the taxation of interstate trade, the earlier 
origin-based system continues to apply. However, there is a provision for input tax credit, so 
as to ensure that the effective rate of tax on interstate transactions does not exceed the 
prescribed 4 percent. While the budget for 2006-07 announced the transition to a 
generalized goods and services tax by 2010, there are a lot of details that need to be worked 
out before such a transition can be implemented. The road map for the transition is expected 
to be announced within the next few months. 
 
Trends in Indian Tax Revenues 
 
This section presents an analysis of the trends in tax revenue in India. The paper focuses 
on the changes in the level and composition of tax revenue since 1991, when systematic 
reforms were set in motion. The analysis shows that despite initiating systematic reforms, 
the revenue productivity of the tax system has not shown an appreciable increase, and the 
decline in tax ratio due to reduction in customs duty could not be compensated by 
internal indirect taxes. 
 The trends in tax revenue in India show four distinct phases (Rao 2000) (Table 3.1). 
First, there was a steady increase in the tax-GDP ratio from 6.3 percent in 1950-51 to 16.1 
percent in 1987-88. In the initial years of planning, an increase in tax ratio was necessitated 
by the need to finance large public sector plans. Thus, the tax ratio increased from a mere 
6.3 percent in 1950-51 to 10.4 percent in 1970-71 and further to 13.8 percent in 1980-81. 
The increase continued until it peaked at 16.1 percent in 1987-88. The buoyancy of the tax 
in later years of the phase was fuelled by the economy attaining a higher growth path and 
progressive substitution of quantitative restrictions with tariffs following initial attempts at 
liberalization in the late 1980s.  
 
Table 3.1. Fiscal Trends in India 
























1981-82 (0.60) 6.4 4.1 46.4 9.4 4.9 14.3 n/a 
1985-86 1.8 8.8 5.7 51.9 10.6 5.3 15.6 n/a 
1990-91 4.2 9.3 4.9 61.4 10.1 5.3 15.4 4.9 
1995-96 3.2 6.5 1.6 60.1 9.4 5.4 14.8 4.3 
1996-97 3.6 6.3 1.1 58.0 9.5 5.2 14.7 4.3 
1997-98 4.2 7.2 2.0 56.5 9.1 5.3 14.5 4.9 
1998-99 6.4 9.0 3.6 58.6 8.3 5.1 13.4 3.7 
1999-00 6.3 9.5 3.8 58.9 8.9 5.3 14.2 3.8 
2000-01 6.5 9.2 3.3 61.5 9.0 5.6 14.6 3.9 
2001-02 6.9 9.6 3.4 63.2 8.2 5.6 13.8 3.8 
2002-03 6.7 9.9 3.4 69.5 8.8 5.9 14.6 3.8 
2003-04 5.8 9.2 2.9 72.4 9.2 6.0 15.2 n/a 
 
  Source: Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Government of India; Annual 
Report, Reserve Bank of India, 2002-03.  
  1Revised estimates. 
 
The second phase started with the economic recession following the severe drought 
of 1987 and was marked by stagnancy in revenues until 1992-93.  However, triggered by the 
pay revision of government employees, the expenditure-GDP ratio increased significantly 
after 1988-89. This caused serious fiscal imbalances (Table 3.2), which led to an 
unprecedented economic crisis in 1991. The subsequent economic reform program led to 
sharp reduction in import duties.  Thus, in the third phase, the tax ratio declined from 15.8 
percent in 1991-92 to the lowest level of 13.4 percent in 1997-98 and fluctuated around 13-
14 percent until 2001-02. The subsequent period has seen gradual increase in the tax ratio. 
Thus, the tax-GDP ratio increased by over one percentage point to 15.2 percent in 2003-04 
(revised estimates for the center and budget estimates for the states). The aggregate tax-GDP 
ratio is yet to reach the levels that prevailed before systematic tax reforms were initiated in 
1991. 
 Interestingly, the trends in tax ratios of direct and indirect taxes follow different 
paths. In the case of the former, the tax ratio remained virtually stagnant throughout the 
period from 1950 to 1990 at about 2 percent of GDP. Thereafter, thanks to the reforms 
marked by significant reduction in the tax rates and simplification of the structure, 
revenue from direct taxes increased sharply to over 4 percent in 2003-04 and is expected 
to be about 4.5 percent in 2004-05. This is in sharp contrast to the steady increase in 
indirect taxes seen during the first forty years of planned development, which, as a ratio 
of GDP increased from 4 percent in 1950-51 to 13.5 percent in 1991-92 and declined 
thereafter to about 11 percent.  
 Fluctuations in the tax ratio are seen mainly at the central level. Central revenues 
constitute about 60 percent of the total and therefore, fluctuations in central tax ratio 
impacts significantly the aggregate tax ratio. During the first thirty-five years of planned 
development (1951 to 1986), the tax ratios at both central and state levels increased 
sharply. Thereafter, the ratio was stagnant at 5.5 percent at the state level until 2001-02 
and then increased marginally to 6 percent in 2003-04. In contrast, the central tax ratio 
which peaked in 1987 remained at that level until 1991-92. In subsequent years, it 
declined until 2001-02, but recovered to the pre-1991 level in 2004-05 (revised 
estimates). At the central level, the share of direct taxes increased from 20 percent in 
1990-91 to over 43 percent in 2004-05.  
 
 
Table 3.2. Trends in Tax Revenue in India 
(As a percentage of GDP) 
 
 Center States Total 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
1950-51 1.8 2.3 4.1 0.6 1.7 2.2 2.3 4.0 6.3 
1960-61 1.7 3.5 5.2 0.6 2.0 2.7 2.3 5.5 7.9 
1970-71 1.9 5.1 7.0 0.3 3.1 3.4 2.2 8.2 10.4 
1980-81 2.1 7.1 9.2 0.2 4.4 4.6 2.3 11.5 13.8 
1985-86 2.0 8.3 10.3 0.2 5.0 5.3 2.2 13.3 15.6 
1987-88 1.9 8.7 10.6 0.2 5.2 5.4 2.1 14.0 16.1 
1990-91 1.9 8.2 10.1 0.2 5.1 5.3 2.2 13.3 15.4 
1991-92 2.4 8.0 10.3 0.2 5.3 5.5 2.6 13.3 15.8 
1995-96 2.8 6.5 9.4 0.2 5.2 5.4 3.0 11.7 14.8 
2000-01 3.3 5.8 9.0 0.2 5.4 5.6 3.4 11.2 14.6 
2001-02 3.0 5.2 8.2 0.2 5.4 5.6 3.2 10.6 13.8 
2002-03 3.4 5.4 8.8 0.2 5.7 5.9 3.5 11.1 14.6 
2003-041 3.8 5.4 9.2 0.2 5.8 6.0 4.0 11.2 15.2 
2004-052 4.3 5.6 9.9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
  Source: Public Finance Statistics, 2003-04. Ministry of Finance, Government of India. 
  1Actual for the center and revised estimate for States.   
  2Revised estimates for Center. 
 
Analysis of Central Taxes 
 
As mentioned earlier, over 60 percent of aggregate tax collections in the country is 
effected at the central level as all broad-based taxes excluding the sales tax have been 
assigned to it. Further, since the trends in central taxes have been decisive in determining 
the overall trends, it is useful to examine these in greater detail.  
 Bird (1993), after observing tax reforms in many countries, states that the “fiscal 
crisis has been proven to be the mother of tax reform,” and Indian experience fits into this. 
However, unlike crises-driven reforms, which are often ad hoc and address immediate 
exigencies of revenue, tax reform in India was undertaken after a detailed analysis. 
Interestingly, contrary to expectations, the period after the introduction of reforms has seen a 
decline in the tax-GDP ratio from 10.3 percent in 1991-92 to 8.2 percent in 2001-02 at the 
central level, before it recovered to about 10 percent in 2004-05. This has prompted many to 
ask whether the tax reforms caused the decline in the tax-GDP ratio.  
 The disaggregated analysis of the trends in central tax revenue presented in Table 
3.3 shows that the sharpest decline in the tax-GDP ratio was in indirect taxes – both 
customs duties and central excise duty. The former declined by about 1.8 percentage 
points from 3.6 percent in 1991-92 to 1.8 percent in 2004-05 and the decline in the latter 
during the period was by one percentage point from 4.3 percent to 3.3 percent. 
Interestingly, the tax ratio from both the taxes declined up to 2001-02 and has stabilized 
at that level. This indicates that while the customs may continue to decline as tariff levels 
are further brought down, the tax ratio from internal indirect taxes are likely to increase if 
reforms towards improving the coverage of service tax and its integration with CenVAT 










Table 3.3. Level and Composition of Central Tax Revenue 
 
 PIT CIT 
Direct 
Tax 
Customs Excise Indirect Total 
As a percentage of GDP 
1985-86 1.0 1.1 2.1 3.6 4.9 8.8 10.9 
1990-91 0.9 0.9 2.0 3.6 4.3 8.2 10.1 
1995-96 1.3 1.4 2.8 3.0 3.4 6.5 9.4 
2000-01 1.5 1.7 3.3 2.3 3.3 5.8 9.0 
2001-02 1.4 1.6 3.0 1.8 3.2 5.2 8.2 
2002-03 1.5 1.9 3.4 1.8 3.3 5.4 8.8 
2003-04 1.5 2.3 3.8 1.8 3.3 5.4 9.2 
2004-051 1.6 2.7 4.3 1.8 3.3 5.6 9.9 
2005-062 1.9 3.1 5.0 1.5 3.5 5.5 10.5 
As a percentage of Total Tax Revenue 
1985-86 9.2 10.1 19.3 33.0 45.0 80.7 100 
1990-91 9.3 9.3 19.2 35.9 42.6 80.8 100 
1995-96 14.0 14.8 30.2 32.1 36.1 69.8 100 
2000-01 16.8 18.9 36.2 25.2 36.3 63.8 100 
2001-02 17.1 19.6 37.0 21.5 38.8 63.0 100 
2002-03 17.0 21.3 38.4 20.7 38.1 64.5 100 
2003-04 16.3 25.0 41.3 19.1 35.7 61.3 100 
2004-051 16.6 27.1 43.9 18.4 32.9 56.1 100 
2005-062 17.9 29.9 47.9 14.4 32.8 52.1 100 
 
  Source: Estimate of Revenues, Central Budget (various years). 
  1 Revised estimates. 
  2 Budget estimates. 
 
In contrast to indirect taxes, there has been a significant increase in the revenue 
from direct taxes. In fact, since the reforms were introduced, the direct tax-GDP ratio 
more than doubled from about 2 percent in 1991-92 to 4.3 percent in 2004-05. The 
increase was seen both in personal income and corporate income taxes, with the tax-GDP 
ratio in the latter increasing by more than three times from 0.9 percent in 1991-92 to 2.7 
percent in 2004-05. The revenue from personal income tax increased from 0.9 percent to 
1.6 percent during the period.  
The decline in the share of customs revenue is certainly to be expected when the 
tariff rates are significantly brought down in the wake of external liberalization. In fact, 
the decline could have been even faster but for the hesitancy on the part of the Finance 
Ministry to reduce the tariffs even more, mainly due to the demands of the domestic 
industry. To some extent, it was expected that increasing imports due to liberalization 
will offset the effect of rate reduction. However, an increase in imports after 
liberalization was not enough to balance the revenues.  
The declining trend in excise duties throughout the 1980s was due to the fact that the 
rate structure assumed when the input tax credit was allowed was perhaps not revenue 
neutral. Continued exemption of small scale sector and widespread use of area based 
exemptions are other important reasons for the decline in excise duties. In addition, due to a 
poor information system, it was possible to claim excessive input tax credit.  Since 1997-98, 
it has been noted that over 75 percent of the increase in GDP is attributable to the growth in 
the services sector, and the manufacturing sector has been relatively stagnant, implying an 
automatic reduction in the ratio of taxes on manufacturing base as a percentage of total 
GDP.  
In contrast to indirect taxes, the revenues from both personal income tax and 
corporate income tax have steadily increased over the years since 1991.  The major reason 
attributed to the increase is improved tax compliance arising from a reduction in marginal 




Level, Composition and Trends in State Taxes  
Table 3.4 presents the trends in states’ tax revenues. It can be seen from the table that 
revenue from state taxes as a ratio of GDP was virtually stagnant throughout the 1990s, 
fluctuating at around 5 to 5.7 percent.  In fact, from 1994-95, the tax ratio declined to 
bottom out at 5.1 percent in 1998-99, the year in which the states had to revise the pay 
scales exacerbating their fiscal problems. In subsequent years, there has been a steady 
improvement in the tax ratio to touch 6 percent in 2003-04.  
Table 3.4. Trends in State Level Taxes 






















1990-91 0.2 3.2 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 5.1 5.5 
1995-96 0.2 3.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 5.2 5.4 
1996-96 0.2 3.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 5.1 5.2 
1997-98 0.1 3.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 5.2 5.4 
1998-99 0.1 3.1 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 5.0 5.1 
1999-00 0.1 3.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 5.2 5.3 
2000-01 0.2 3.5 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 5.4 5.7 
2001-02 0.2 3.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 5.4 5.7 
2002-03 0.2 3.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 5.7 5.9 
2003-04 0.2 3.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 5.8 6.0 
 
Source: Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance (relevant years). 
 
 Of the different state taxes, the sales tax is predominant and constitutes about 60 
percent of total state tax revenues. Therefore, not surprisingly, the overall trend in states’ 
tax ratio follows closely the trends in sales tax revenue. The revenue from sales tax after 
reaching a low of 3.1 percent in 1998-99, has increased marginally to 3.5 percent in 
2000-01. It has remained at that level thereafter. Any attempt to improve the revenue 
productivity of states’ tax system has to deal with the reform of sales taxes. Therefore, 
the recent move towards destination-based VAT is extremely important.  
 State excise duty is a sumptuary tax on alcoholic products. On this, there has 
always been a problem of balancing regulatory and revenue considerations. The major 
components of the tax come from arrack, country liquor, and India Made Foreign Liquor 
(IMFL), including beer. The duty collected is by way of a license fee on the sale/auction 
of vends and taxes on consumption. The problem in regard to country liquor is the 
brewing and consumption of illicit liquor. This has not only caused a loss of revenue, but 
has also been an important health hazard. With regard to IMFL, in one of the states, it 
was estimated that actual evasion of the tax may be as high as three times the revenue 
collected (Karnataka 2001). The way to deal with this problem has more to do with 
strengthening the tax administration and information system and less to do with the 
structure of the tax. 
 The principal source of stamp duties and registration fees is the sale of immovable 
property transactions. The most important problem afflicting this tax is undervaluation of 
the value of the property transacted.  This is partially due to the high rates of tax. In fact, 
until recently, the tax rates were as high as 12 to 15 percent on the value of transactions 
(NIPFP 1996). Many of the states which reduced the rates have found the typical working 
of the Laffer curve phenomenon and have started reforms to reduce the rates in this 
direction. Undervaluation of immovable property is aided by the lack of an organized 
market.  
 At the local level, there are two taxes of some significance. These are the taxes on 
property, and in some states, Octroi – the tax on the entry of goods into a local area for 
consumption, use or sale – levied by urban local bodies. The major problem with urban 
property taxes, like in the case of registration fees, is undervaluation. Alternative models 
of reform, using the capital value or rental value for valuing the property, have been 
suggested. The ultimate reform depends on the development of an organized property 
market. In most cases, the recommendations suggested have been to use the guided value 
determined in some independent manner. As regards Octroi, this check-post-based levy 
not only impedes internal trade and violates the principle of common market, but also is a 
source of corruption and rent seeking. Most states have eliminated this levy in recent 
times.  
 




Over the last decade and a half, thanks to simplifying reforms, the irritants in the tax 
system have been reduced significantly. The structure has been rationalized, both in terms 
of tax rates and associated brackets. Remaining issues relate to the plethora of tax 
preferences built into the tax regime. These preferences took the form of deductions from 
taxable income in some cases – for instance, reimbursement of medical expenses and 
contributions to pension funds – and rebate in tax payable in others.10 The latter included 
a wide range of investment options. Each of these provisions was associated with a 
separate ceiling, suggesting significant scope and the need for tax planning in order to 
benefit from the variety of provisions. One sector which receives a significant degree of 
incentives within personal income tax is the housing sector. For debt-financed investment 
in a residential accommodation by tax paying individuals, the tax statutes provided for 
incentives both on interest payment and repayment of the principle. As a part of a major 
exercise to consolidate the tax structure, the budget of 2005-06, consolidated a number of 
these preferences into a single broad provision of deduction from taxable income, with no 
individual ceilings prescribed. This was proposed as a part of an initiative to make a 
transition from a regime of exempt – exempt – exempt mode11 of treatment of savings 
and investment to one of exempt – exempt – tax mode. In the former regime, investments 
in designated savings instruments were exempt. The returns from these investments were 
also exempt, and even when the savings were liquidated after the lock in period, tax was 
not payable. In the new regime, the tax will be paid when the savings instruments are 
liquidated. Another major change introduced was the elimination of the standard 
deduction provision. Alongside, there was an increase in the exemption threshold to 
compensate for the change in the structure. There is some debate regarding the equity 
implications of such a change. While the change does reduce the complexity of the 
regime, it does imply a change in the balance of the tax regime in favour of self-
employed as against salaried individuals.  
A few issues remain, however. The transition to the EET regime is not yet 
complete. There is no time path specified. Given the multiplicity of instruments for 
savings, there is a lack of clarity on whether investment in all forms would be subject to 
EET or whether the treatment would be limited to some specified instruments. The latter 
approach would require a mechanism for delineation of future streams of incomes, as 
well for taxation purposes, thereby introducing a degree of complexity into the tax 
regime.  
Within corporate income taxation, there are two sets of issues: one relating to the 
rationale for a minimum alternate tax, and the other relating to the increasing number of 
stand-alone taxes incorporated into the tax regime, so as to plug existing loopholes in the 
tax structure. Some of these are discussed below.  
 
Minimum Alternate Tax 
 
As mentioned in the earlier section, whenever the tax payable on taxable income 
computed as per the Income Tax Act is less than 7.5 percent of the book profit of the 
company, then this company is subject to a minimum alternate tax of 10 percent of the 
book profit, as defined, in the Income Tax Act. Like regular income tax, this tax is also 
topped by a surcharge of 2.5 percent and an additional education charge of 2 percent. 
Certain incomes are exempt from this tax. These are income from certain infrastructure 
industries, income from units in specified backward areas, income of certain loss-making 
companies, and export profits. The primary implication of this tax is to place a ceiling on 
the incentive provided to companies by way of accelerated depreciation or incentives 
other than those mentioned above.12 
The tax preferences available can broadly be divided into two categories:   
a. Provisions relating to depreciation, insofar as they are at variance with the 
prescriptions of the Companies Act. The depreciation provisions in the Income 
Tax Act until March 2005 provided for a higher rate of depreciation of 20 percent 
on plant and machinery, a historical legacy from the times of significantly higher 
tax rates. While major corrections have been incorporated from the budget of 
2005-06, some differences persist.  
b. Exemptions and concessions provided to address concerns of geographical equity 
or to encourage certain sectors of the economy.  
The expert opinion is that the underlying causes for divergence between income as 
defined in the Income Tax Act and Companies Act should be corrected, so as to ensure a 
convergence between these two definitions of income, both for reasons of rational tax 
policy and transparency and good corporate governance.  
In terms of depreciation, it is not clear what the rationale for continued differences 
between the Income Tax Act and the Companies Act is. The Companies Act attempts to 
be faithful to the concept of depreciation – wear and tear in the course of use of a 
machine or any other good. Given that this gets intimately related to the expected life of 
the machine and the number of hours per day the machine is expected to run, the 
depreciation provisions in this Act vary the rate by the type of machine and the number of 
shifts it runs in a day. However, given that the resources so allocated is a notional entry in 
the books of account, and the fact that depreciation has to attend to obsolescence of 
technology/equipment as well, it is desirable to explore a less information/monitoring 
intensive formula for depreciation. In this sense, the provisions as per the Income Tax 
Act require less detail for application, especially in the case of machinery and plants.  
Turning to the second category of tax preferences, there are broadly five 
categories of exemptions and tax preferences available in the tax statutes, apart from the 
preferential treatment of agricultural income and income of charitable institutions: area-
based exemptions for investment in backward areas, exemptions for exports and special 
economic zones (SEZs), exemptions for investment in power generation and other 
infrastructure sectors, investments in real estate development (especially for housing 
projects), and investments in the food-processing sector.  
The effects of these incentives have been mixed. There is considerable distortion 
in economic decision making due to these incentive options. In the case of backward-area 
incentives, for instance, investments are found to occur in industries with low investment 
requirements, low value added, and hence, low employment potential. (TECS, 2004) This 
also suggests the possibility that at the end of the incentive period, most of these 
industries may move out and return to the original location. On the one hand, this distorts 
resource allocation in the economy. On the other hand, this does not generate conditions 
for the sustainable growth of backward regions. Similarly, in the case of incentives for 
exports, there appears to be little ground for extending such benefits when India has the 
unenviable status of being the country against whose goods the countervailing duty 




The fringe-benefits tax, as discussed above, is payable by the companies but is supposed 
to be a tax on the employees.13  Further, this tax is payable even if the company is 
otherwise not liable to pay corporate income tax. There are a number of problems with 
this approach. First, through this provision, the government has introduced multiple 
measures for taxation of perquisites and fringe benefits provided by the employer to the 
employees. This provision is over and above the existing provision of taxation of 
perquisites as part of personal income tax. Second, this tax is introduced through an 
additional Act with its own rules and procedures and a separate return and assessments, 
making compliance tedious and costly. A simpler approach might be one involving 
expansion in the scope of taxation of perquisites where benefits can be assigned to 
identifiable beneficiaries within the income tax, alongside disallowing part or all of the 
expenditure deduction of other non-assignable items to capture the tax on such fringe 
benefits. Since, for most companies liable to this tax, personal income tax payable on the 
wages and salaries to employees would be deductible at source, there would be no 
additional compliance costs with this approach. Further, this would not require a separate 
Act with its own rules and procedures, thereby easing the compliance requirements. The 
only situation where the liability might be reduced is in the case of loss-making 
companies, since the disallowed expenditure would only contribute to higher losses and 
hence no taxes; this situation alone cannot merit a separate enactment.  
 
Banking Cash Transactions Tax 
 
This tax is introduced as a means of curtailing cash transactions – a means by which a 
number of taxes including income tax are evaded. The tax, levied at 0.1 percent, is 
applicable on cash withdrawals from non-saving accounts held with banks, provided the 
amount of cash withdrawn is more than Rs. 25,000 in the case of individuals and Rs. 
100,000 in the case of firms. While the rationale for the tax is fairly appealing, there is a 
need to step back and analyze the factors that encourage cash transactions. For instance, it 
would be useful to determine the extent of overlap between the formal-sector banking 
institutions and the black economy. To the extent that income which becomes black or 
unaccounted remains outside the network, this tax can only address the additions to the 
stock and not the stock itself. Without addressing the root cause, there is a good 
likelihood that alternative informal sector institutions evolve to address the needs in this 
changed environment. For instance, since this tax is applicable only to transactions 
through scheduled commercial banks and not to cooperative sector banks, this may 
provide one of the many escape routes.  
 
Securities Transactions Tax 
 
The tax on transactions in securities in a recognized stock exchange in India was 
introduced in 2004-05 at 0.15 percent. This tax is expected to reduce speculative trading 
in the stock markets and volatility in prices since this tax would be applicable to each 
such transaction. The rationale for this tax seems to stem from a perceived inability to 
appropriately tax the financial economy. One loophole which finds frequent mention in 
this context is the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement of India with Mauritius. Under 
this treaty, corporate bodies registered in Mauritius would be taxed under Mauritian law 
rather than Indian law. Since Mauritius does not tax capital gains and dividends, it 
provides a viable routing option for avoiding taxes in India. Interestingly, this treatment 
has now been extended to the DTAA with Singapore as well. Further, given the impact of 
these agreements, the tax law was amended to eliminate taxation of long term capital 
gains and reduce the taxation of short term capital gains to 10 percent along with an STT 
of 0.15 percent. Though the solution appears appropriate in the limited context, it is not 




The major issues related to indirect taxes can be classified into two categories: those 
relating to exemptions and tax preferences and those relating to the development of a 
coordinated system of domestic trade taxes. 
 
Tax Preferences  
 
Tax preferences within indirect taxes include, in addition to a list of exempt commodities 
both in excise and customs duties, exemptions for investment in backward areas and for 
small-scale units in the case of excise duty and a variety of duty-drawback schemes for 
exports in the case of customs duties.14 Given the stated intent of reform to consolidate 
the taxes and reduce the number of rate brackets, there is an emergent need to reexamine 
the need for commodity-wise exemptions. This holds for both excise duty and customs 
duty. Similarly, in the case of the Service Tax, the tax continues to be structured as a levy 
on specified services. Implicit in this definition is a notion of exemption for all uncovered 
services. While the list of taxable services is being expanded in every budget, it still 
remains selective. The limitations of such an arrangement are taken up in the discussion 
on a coordinated system of consumption taxes.  
As mentioned in the discussion on direct taxes, tax exemptions and preferences 
tend to distort economic decision making. The excise exemptions provided, along with 
income tax holidays for investment in backward areas, do not induce sustainable 
economic activities. Given the substantial differential induced by these exemptions, 
activities which are subject to high rates of tax tend to gravitate to these areas. Further, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that such incentives are prone to evasion through appropriate 
accounting and billing, without inducing the corresponding scale of economic activity 
even in the short run. Thus, such incentives do not provide gains which are sustainable in 
the long run and need to be reconsidered. Similarly, the incentives for small-scale units 
encourage artificial truncation of economic activities at the defining threshold. Further, 
these units evolve into a strong interest group which then lobbies for an enhancement of 
the qualifying threshold thereby expanding the scope of the provision. While the intent is 
to incentivize only small units, which subsequently grow and move out of the incentive 
regime, the net impact at the margin at the time of transition is large enough to invoke 
significant resistance.  
 
Coordinated System of Consumption Taxes 
 
The Constitution of India assigns the power to tax domestic trade in the following 
manner: 
a. The central government is assigned the power to levy excise duty on 
manufactured goods.  
b. The state governments are assigned the power to tax sale of goods within a state’s 
geographical boundaries. 
c. The center is empowered to tax the sale of goods when the event spans two states. 
d. Following a recent constitutional amendment, the center is empowered to tax all 
services, except those explicitly assigned to the states such as railways, 
entertainment, and transportation by road. 
This assignment clearly works against the evolution of coordinated and comprehensive 
system of taxation of consumption in the country. The state sales taxes have made a 
transition from predominantly cascading type first-point taxes to that of instrastate value 
added taxes on goods – a transition that could be made while remaining within their 
constitutional assignment. On the other hand, the center made a transition from a 
manufacturing excise duty to a manufacturer’s value added tax, and subsequently 
attempted a limited integration of the tax on services with the tax on goods through the 
tax credit mechanism. The Union budget of 2006-07 has announced that the country 
would make a transition from the present structure to a generalized goods and services 
tax by 2010. There is a huge distance to be covered before such a transition can be 
completed. Some of the key issues that need to be resolved are as follows: 
a. Will this be a single tax governing all taxes on goods and services? In other 
words, would it encompass both central and state-level taxes?  
b. Should the country plan the transition directly to this prescribed state or is a 
transition path necessary?  
 A single goods and services tax would certainly be a harmonized domestic trade 
tax and would be desirable from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. This, however, 
would call for the states to surrender their fiscal autonomy. This part of the bargain would 
not be easy to achieve. Kelkar Task Force Report (India 2004) suggests a “Grand 
Bargain” between the center and states to achieve this. Further, even if such a bargain is 
effectively struck, there is a need for an institutional mechanism to enforce the new 
regime, unless it can take the form of a constitutional amendment. Once the bargain is 
struck, the next big question would be regarding administration of the new tax. With a 
single tax structure, it is not a big argument to make a case for a single agency 
administering the tax. However, which level of government will administer the tax and 
how the tax administrators at the non-administering level will be redeployed will have to 
be resolved. At a time when both center and states have embarked on fiscal adjustment, it 
is not going to be easy to resolve this issue. This is further complicated by the coalition 
governments, where multiple parties have pivotal status.  
The second set of issues relates to the transition from the present state to the 
proposed GST. The state-level VAT regimes are themselves considered to be a transition 
measure. Extending the prevailing instrastate VAT into an interstate VAT is necessary to 
make the tax system destination-based. For this transition to be complete, at least so far 
as the goods segment of the economy is concerned, the Central Sales Tax (CST) – the tax 
levied by the Union government on interstate sale of goods – will have to be phased out. 
Given that intrastate sales will be taxed at regular rates and interstate transactions will 
potentially suffer no tax burden, there is a need for an appropriate mechanism for 
monitoring interstate trade before the tax can be eliminated. Of the many alternatives 
available, especially ones that do not require an overarching presence of the union 
government, the one that appears most suitable and least risky is zero-rating with pre-
payment as described below. 
 This model works on the principle of zero-rating with the difference that the 
exporter in the exporting state will get the benefit of zero-rating his transaction provided 
the importer in the importing state has accounted for the transaction and paid the tax on 
the same. This could either mean that the transaction is accounted for in the next tax 
period and the tax due is paid or that the importer agrees to pay the tax on every 
individual transaction at the time of placing the order and/or receipt of the goods. For 
instance, for an export transaction of Rs 1000 from state A to state B, the exporter in state 
A, verifies the registration number of the buyer from state B and claims zero-rating for 
this transaction as a part of his tax return. In state B, if the rate of tax is 10 percent, the 
buyer declares the purchase of Rs 1000 and pays Rs 100 as the tax due on the transaction, 
as a part of his tax return. There would be verification of this information across the 
states and any mismatch would invoke a reversal of the taxes refunded to the exporter. 15 
 
While this mechanism safeguards revenues of the exporting and the importing state, the 
cost of such a security is borne by either the exporter or the importer in the form of higher 
interest burden, and of verifying the credentials of the buyer. The difference between this 
system and the system of simply zero-rating is that in the present one the importer pays 
the tax at the time of the receipt of goods whereas, in the case of zero-rating, the tax has 
to be paid at the time of sale of goods. Since local purchases would suffer tax upfront, 
there is a level playing field between local purchases and interstate purchases in a pre-
payment system. (See Rao (2005) for a discussion of the alternatives).  
Once these reforms are made, the only other major problem remaining will be the 
treatment of services within the state VAT regime. If services continue to be outside the 
state VAT base, there are a few immediately apparent services that can add severely to 
the cost of manufacturing and trade – transportation and electricity. These are inputs into 
most manufacturing activities, use goods for the supply of services and could suffer 
significant cascading. This is especially important, since petrol and diesel are being kept 
out of the VAT net, thereby perpetuating tax cascading in some form or the other.  
In the context of the announced transition to a generalized GST, it is not clear 
how expansion of the scope of state VAT to include services can be worked out. 
Inclusion of selective localized services, as the above example illustrates, would not 
address the basic issue of cascading within the tax system. The discussion of a 
comprehensive power to tax services, however, needs a definition of treatment of services 
of an interstate nature. Here, options available differ depending on whether or not there is 
an overarching central tax. Given the context of GST, therefore, it is difficult to discuss 
reform of state VAT without reference to this context.  
 
Analysis of the Trends and Economic Impact of the Tax System 
 
In this section, the observed trends in different central and state taxes are explained in some 
detail, and the possible efficiency and equity implications of different taxes is analyzed. 
Specifically, the analysis seeks to raise a number of questions. These include, has tax 
compliance improved over the years in response to a reduction in marginal tax rates? What 
other factors influence revenue productivity of the tax system?  What are the efficiency and 
equity implications of the tax system? 
 
Personal Income Tax 
 
The increase in revenue productivity of personal income tax is attributed to the 
improvement in tax compliance arising from the sharp reduction in marginal tax rates in 
1991-92 and 1996-97.  This is reflected in the negative correlation between effective tax 
rates and the ratio of income tax collections to GDP, akin to a Laffer curve.16 Das-Gupta 
and Mookherjee (1997) attribute improvement in the overall performance of the tax 
system to the reduction in the marginal tax rates. In a more recent analysis based on 
sixteen different structural, administrative, and institutional indicators, Das-Gupta (2002) 
concludes that the performance of the tax system has shown improvement and tax 
compliance has indeed improved after a reduction in marginal tax rates. Bhalla (2005) 
estimates the aggregate revenue elasticity at -1.43 percent and concludes that the 1996-97 





























1994-95 22.18 56.87 17178.72 3357.76 0.37 
1995-96 22.21 50.01 22949.61 6462.48 0.42 
1996-97 50.87 27.30 20042.48 1808.49 0.75 
1997-98 50.87 24.10 19270.19 2169.60 0.64 
1998-99 52.44 23.59 22411.98 2171.83 0.67 
1999-00 53.69 24.58 28684.29 3029.79 0.80 
2000-01 63.22 20.89 35162.61 3398.63 1.06 
2001-02 67.10 19.23 35358.00 3354.00 1.04 
2002-03 65.55 20.26 42119 5253 1.12 
2003-04 64.03 20.04 48454 7067 1.12 
 
  Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Direct Taxes) Government of 
India (various years).  
 
Can we attribute improved revenue performance of direct taxes only to a reduction 
in marginal tax rates? A close scrutiny of the revenue generated by personal income tax 
shows that an increase in the scope of Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) is the main 
contributor to the revenue increase (Table 3.5). The proportion of TDS to total revenue 
collections increased from 22 percent in 1994-95 to 50 percent in 1996-97 and further to 67 
percent in 2001-02 before declining marginally to 64 percent in 2003-04. As a proportion of 
GDP, the ratio of collections from TDS increased by 0.67 percentage points over the period 
considered. This suggests that improved compliance is largely, if not solely, due to 
improved coverage or greater effectiveness of TDS as a tool for collecting taxes. This 
observation however runs contrary to the results quoted above.  
 Interestingly, although it is tempting to attribute this to an increase in the scope of 
TDS on interest, dividends, payments to contractors, and insurance commissions, much 
of the increase has come about in TDS in salaries. Thus, an increase in tax revenue has 
possibly more to do with the expansion of the organized sector, financialization of the 
economy, and administrative measures on extending the TDS, rather than improved 
compliance due to a reduction in marginal rates of tax. During the period from 1999-00 to 
2003-04, the total number of personal income tax assesses increased from 19.6 million to 
28.8 million. Broader coverage of PAN and expanded use of PAN and the TIN have 
helped to create an extensive and reliable database to improve tax compliance. The above 
evidence, however, cannot be interpreted as presenting a case for increasing the marginal 
tax rates, since such increases would be associated with significant efficiency costs. 
 It is important to understand the impact of a reduction in the marginal tax rate and 
a reduction in the number of rate categories since 1991-92 on the overall progressivity 
and equity of the tax system. With the reduction in the marginal tax rates, the effective 
rate declines as the level of income increases. From this, it would be tempting to 
conclude that progressivity has declined and overall equity has worsened over the years. 
Such a conclusion would be inappropriate – what this shows is that among income 
taxpayers, the progressivity has declined. But this is also a period where there is a 
substantial increase in the coverage of income tax - in 2003-04, as many as 29 million 
people paid income tax as compared to 3.9 million in 1989-90. The tax-GDP ratio has 
doubled to more than 2 percent of GDP. This expansion in coverage would suggest that 
by bringing in a larger proportion of people into the tax net, there would be some 
improvement in horizontal equity – people with similar incomes remaining outside the 
tax net are possibly now paying taxes.  
 
 
Corporate Income Tax 
 
Of the four major taxes considered, the revenue from the corporation tax grew at the 
fastest rate during the 1990s. As a ratio of GDP, the revenue from the tax increased by 
three times from 0.9 percent in 1990-91 to 2.7 percent in 2003-04, despite significant 
reduction in the rates. The reforms focused mainly on doing away with the distinction 
between closely held and widely held companies, reducing the marginal tax rates to align 
them with the top marginal tax rate of personal income tax, and rationalizing tax 
preferences – investment allowance and depreciation allowance – to a considerable 
extent. 
 It would be instructive to analyze the contribution of different sectors to the 
corporation tax. The contribution of manufacturing sector according to the prowess 
database, accounts for two-thirds of corporate tax collections (Table 3.6). The analysis 
shows that the manufacturing sector contributed 40 percent of the corporation tax in 
2003-04. Within the manufacturing sector, the petroleum sector contributed the highest 
(12.5 percent), followed by chemicals (6.5 percent), and basic metal industry (6.1 
percent). In contrast, the contribution of textiles was just about 0.5 percent. In fact, in 
1994-95, industries such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment contributed 
overwhelming proportion of the corporation tax, but their share declined sharply over the 
years.  While part of the decline can be attributed to changes in the shares of these 
industries in total profits, this does not seem to be the only factor. For financial 
intermediation for instance, while the share in total profits increased from 18 percent to 
28 percent between 1994-95 and 2003-04, its share in total corporate tax collections 
changed from 12 percent to 30 percent during the same period. On the other hand, while 
share of manufacturing declined from 67 percent to 40 per cent in profits, its share in tax 
revenue changed only from 52 percent to 36 percent.  
 
Table 6. Sectoral Composition of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) Collections 
(as percent of total CIT collections ) 
 
 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Mining 2.41 5.20 10.55 11.47 12.88 18.66 22.45 18.27 21.97 13.92 
Manufacturing           
Food Products 6.75 3.69 2.96 3.88 4.55 4.77 4.76 3.67 3.43 3.46 
Textiles 1.92 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.56 0.55 0.64 0.37 0.47 0.52 
Leather 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Paper and Wood 1.61 2.29 0.78 0.53 0.44 0.75 0.89 0.94 0.58 0.74 
Petro products 11.75 12.21 7.55 5.50 9.42 6.28 4.97 7.46 11.13 12.48 
Chemicals 17.21 13.98 8.67 7.58 6.89 5.74 5.41 5.43 6.00 6.46 
Rubber and Plastics 0.87 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.93 0.80 0.51 0.47 0.61 0.50 
Non-metallic minerals 1.20 1.82 0.82 0.53 0.46 0.38 0.57 0.40 0.30 0.48 
Basic metals and  
  products 
3.84 4.70 4.32 3.08 3.60 4.45 4.22 2.95 2.86 6.09 
Machinery 13.34 9.90 8.68 6.40 6.35 5.75 3.51 3.92 3.63 3.88 
Transport equipment 8.80 10.84 9.41 6.37 5.65 4.61 2.41 3.06 3.96 5.31 
Total: Manufacturing 67.33 60.93 44.74 35.27 38.9 34.19 27.96 28.69 32.99 39.95 
Electricity gas and steam 0.34 1.70 1.70 8.80 11.49 7.51 9.09 6.49 5.57 1.91 
Construction  2.44 1.73 1.38 1.17 1.38 1.27 1.17 0.97 0.89 1.31 
Wholesale and retail trade 3.29 2.27 3.31 3.41 2.23 1.89 3.00 2.94 3.03 2.99 
Hotels and restaurants 1.15 1.37 0.97 0.62 0.53 0.35 0.38 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Transport services 0.36 2.27 2.12 2.07 1.39 1.42 1.91 1.50 1.49 1.27 
Post and telecom 10.07 7.91 6.13 5.95 7.58 4.29 5.72 6.35 2.61 6.50 
Financial intermediation 11.89 15.95 28.34 30.39 22.37 28.54 25.83 32.01 28.67 29.74 
Real estate 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Computer, R&D and other  
  business services 
0.67 0.60 0.64 0.72 1.06 1.46 2.19 2.21 2.13 1.79 
Social services 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.39 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.40 
Proportion of Total CIT  
  Collections 
50.06 62.16 77.39 80.82 64.54 62.21 61.95 72.62 80.38 65.09 
 
  Source: Prowess database. 
 
 Another important issue examined here refers to the contribution of the public sector 
enterprises. Curiously, the contribution by public enterprises has shown a significant 
increase since 1991. In fact, the share fell from 23 percent in 1990-91 to 19 percent in 1994-
95, but increased thereafter to constitute about 38 percent in 2002-03. This meant that over 
40 percent of the increase in corporation tax was collected from public enterprises (Table 
3.7).  This is partly due to the fact that public enterprises do not undertake elaborate tax 
planning to minimize the taxes, unlike the private sector.  
 Thirdly, given that MAT was introduced to reduce the gap between the effective 
tax rates that companies face, it would be instructive to examine the variation in the tax 
rates as they exist today. Table 3.8 below provides a classification of fifty major business 
houses in India, in terms of their average effective tax rate.17 The table clearly illustrates 
the wide spread in tax rates across difference business houses. Interestingly, given that 
depreciation allowances were one important contributor to the divergence between book 
profit and income as per the Income Tax Act, even after correcting for depreciation, the 
variance continues to persist, reflecting the large impact of other tax preferences. A 
similar exercise for a sectoral decomposition of economic activity brings to light a range 
of 4 percent to 38 percent. Given that these numbers pertain to a year where the MAT 
too, was applicable, clearly, the provision was not enough to ensure a narrow range. The 
budgetary process seeks to correct this observed feature through an increase in the rate 
for MAT in budget for 2006-07, to 10 percent. This solution to the perceived problem of 
leakages from the general tax regime and the resultant sustenance of zero-tax companies, 
appears to be a perverse solution. The tax statutes seek to provide incentives on one hand 
and neutralize or tone down the benefits of the same through the provisions of MAT. A 
simpler and more transparent alternative would be to reduce or eliminate incentives and 
eliminate the need for an additional levy. 
 
Table 3.7. Contribution of Public Sector Enterprises to Corporation Tax 
 
Year 





Percent of tax by 
public sector to 
total 
1990-91 1229.3 5335 23.04 
1991-92 1674.11 7853 21.32 
1992-93 1804.37 8899 20.28 
1993-94 2109.93 10060 20.97 
1994-95 2581.46 13822 18.68 
1995-96 4186.66 16487 25.39 
1996-97 5192.51 18567 27.97 
1997-98 5634.11 20016 28.15 
1998-99 6499.00 24529 26.50 
1999-00 7706.25 30692 25.11 
2000-01 9313.62 35696 26.09 
2001-02 12254.32 36609 33.47 
2002-03 17429.95 46172 37.75 
 
  Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Government of India (various years).  
 
Union Excise Duties 
 
The declining tax-GDP ratio of union excise duties is a matter of concern, adding to the 
reduction in import duties. The reforms in union excise duties, transforming it into 
ModVAT and then CenVAT, instead of improving the revenue productivity, have led to 
its decline over the years. The revenue from the tax as a ratio of GDP at 3.3 percent in 
2004-05 is significantly lower than the ratio in 1991-92 (4.1 percent). A similar trend is 
witnessed, even if one considers the ratio of excise to GDP from manufacturing sector. 
 That this is a cause for concern is apparent, given the overall context of declining 
reliance on custom duties as a source of revenue and an incomplete compensation by way 
of increases in the direct tax collections. The declining contribution from CenVAT on 
manufactured products is all the more intriguing in the wake of a fast-increasing 
corporation tax. Examination of the sectoral composition of corporate income tax 
indicates that services-sector, power-generation, and primary-sector-based companies 
have recorded relatively faster growth, especially when compared with manufacturing 
units and in the event, the share of the manufacturing sector in corporate tax revenues 
declined from 60 percent to 39 percent. This, however, does not provide the entire 
answer. Even if one considers only the manufacturing sector, the ratio of CenVAT 
collections to payments of corporate income tax has not been stable. It is seen that the 
ratio increased steadily until 2000-01 and declined thereafter. This trend behavior is 
driven largely by the performance of corporate tax payments as a ratio of sales, which 
declined consistently till 2000-01 and then recorded a reversal. One explanation for this 
decline could be found in the decline in interest rates and the corresponding increase in 
profits relative to sales from 2000-01. 
 
Table 3.8. Distribution of Corporate Houses by Effective Tax Rate 
 
Range Corporate Tax Paid Inclusive of Deferred Tax 
0-3 
J.K. Singhania Group, Essar (Ruia) 
Group, Williamson Magor Group, 
Arvind Mafatlal Group, Usha 
Rectifier Group 
Usha Rectifier Group 
3-6 
Lalbhai Group, Gulabchand Doshi 
Group, HCL Group 
 
6-9 
Videocon Group, Raunaq Singh 
Group, LNJ Bhilwara Group, 
Vardhman Group, Reliance Group 
Lalbhai Group, Essar (Ruia) Group, 
Williamson Magor Group, Arvind 
Mafatlal Group 
[Ambani], Godrej Group,  WIPRO 
Group, Dalmia Group 
9-12 
Goenka G.P. (Duncans) Group, 
Modi Bhupendra Kumar, Rasesh 
Mafatlal Group, Chidambaram M.A. 
Group, Hari Shankar Singhania 
Group, RPG Enterprises Group, 
Bangur B.D. Group, Om Prakash 
Jindal Group 
WIPRO Group, Godrej Group, 
Rasesh Mafatlal Group, HCL 
Group, J.K. Singhania Group, 
Chidambaram M.A. Group, Modi 
Bhupendra Kumar 
12-15 
Vinod Doshi Group, Kirloskar 
Group, Ruchi Group 
LNJ Bhilwara Group, Vinod Doshi 
Group, Kirloskar Group, Hari 
Shankar Singhania Group 
15-18 Piramal Ajay Group, DCM Group 
Reliance Group [Ambani], 
Gulabchand Doshi Group 
18-21 
Shriram Industrial Enterprises 
Group, Ranbaxy Group, Nagarjuna 
Group, Mahindra & Mahindra 
Group, Vijaypat Singhania Group, 
Tata Group 
Vardhman Group, DCM Group, 
Raunaq Singh Group, Bangur B.D. 
Group 
21-24 
Lakshmi Group [Naidu G.V.], 
Larsen & Toubro Group 
Vijaypat Singhania Group, Ranbaxy 
Group, Tata Group, RPG 
Enterprises Group, Piramal Ajay 
Group, Shriram Industrial 
Enterprises Group 
24-27 
Escorts Group, Bajaj Group, 
Murugappa Chettiar Group,  T.V.S. 
Iyengar Group, Birla Group 
Larsen & Toubro Group, Mahindra 
& Mahindra Group, Goenka G.P. 
(Duncans) Group, Bajaj Group 
27-30 
T.V.S. Iyengar Group, Birla Aditya 
Group, Kalyani  Group, Firodia 
Group, MRF Group, Amalgamation 
Group, Finolex Group 
Murugappa Chettiar Group, Dalmia 
Group 
30-33 
UB Group, Wadia (Bombay Dyeing) 
Group,  Hero (Munjals) Group,  
Finolex (Chhabria P.P.) Group, Birla 
Aditya Group, Ruchi Group, T.V.S. 
Iyengar Group, Kalyani (Bharat 
Forge) Group 
33-36  
MRF Group, Hero (Munjals) Group, 
Om Prakash Jindal Group, Wadia 
(Bombay Dyeing) Group, 
Amalgamation Group 
36-39  
Lakshmi Group [Naidu G.V.], 
Firodia Group, Escorts Group, UB 
Group, Nagarjuna Group, Videocon 
Group 
 
  Source: Derived from the Prowess Database. 
  Note: Effective tax rate is the ratio of total corporate tax paid to book profits (profits 
before tax reported in the profit and loss account). Revised accounting standards from 
2001 require companies to set aside resources to meet “deferred tax liabilities.”  
Important among these liabilities is liability on account of accelerated depreciation 
provisions of the Income Tax Act. the last column measures effective tax rate inclusive of 
deferred tax liabilities.  
 
 Another interesting feature of trends in CenVAT collections, as derived from the 
corporate sector database, is the general decline in the ratio of excise collections to sales. 
This ratio is computed alternatively for all manufacturing companies with positive profit 
and for companies with positive excise tax payments. In the former case, the average rate 
of tax is lower and the rate of decline slower than that for the latter case. This is a 
reflection of an increase in the extent of preferential treatments within the tax statutes. An 
expansion in the coverage or utilization of the preferential treatment would result in an 
expansion in sales without corresponding expansion in the tax payments. While this 
could also be the result of an increase in share of exports in total value of output, 
correcting for this factor does not change the observed trends. The other set of factors that 
could induce such a result are the various categories of exemptions, like those for 
investment in backward areas and for small scale units. 
 Not only has the revenue productivity of CenVAT declined over the years, but 
even the composition shows an increase in revenue concentration, particularly towards 
commodities which serve as inputs into further production. Independent operation of 
excise and sales tax systems and confining the tax to goods and to the manufacturing 
stage alone does not remove cascading. Also, final products in the manufacturing stage 
are not necessarily final consumer goods – goods transport vehicles being a prime 
example.  
 Decomposition of CenVAT collections, presented in Table 3.9, brings out some 
interesting features with implications for both efficiency and equity of the tax system. 
One of the most important features is the commodity concentration. Just five groups of 
commodities – namely, petroleum products, chemicals, basic metals, transport vehicles, 
and electrical and electronic goods – together contribute to 75 percent of total revenue 
collections from excise duty.  It is normally expected that over the years, with 
diversification in manufacturing, the commodity concentration in excise duty should 
reduce. Contrarily, the commodity concentration has only increased over the years with a 
single group, petroleum products, contributing to over 40 percent of the collections, with 
a more than three times increase in share over a thirteen-year period, while the value 
added by this industry group has increased only marginally from 12 to 14 percent of GDP 
from registered manufacturing sector. This imposes a disproportionate tax burden on 
different sectors of the economy. Besides, this type of commodity concentration does not 
allow for objective calibration of policies in regard to excise duties, as the Finance 
Ministry would not like to lose revenue from this lucrative source.  
 Another important consequence of this pattern of revenue collections is that an 
overwhelming proportion of the duties are collected from intermediate products, which 
are used in the production of goods or services which are not subject to excise. Besides 
petroleum products, which are used mainly in transportation of goods and persons 
involved in or related to other manufacturing, the taxes on all goods serving as inputs to 
service providers, especially of services used as inputs to manufacturing activities, 
contribute to cascading and add to the production cost. Transport vehicles and related 
industries are one such industry. These are a significant source of inefficiency in the 
system. This also makes it difficult to speculate on the distribution of tax burden in terms 
of different income classes, as it is difficult to speculate on the effect of the tax on 
different manufacturing enterprises and its effects on employment and incomes.  
 
Table 3.9. Revenue from Union Excise Duties by Commodity Groups 
 
 1990-91 1995-96 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
Food products 4.01 3.55 4.80 4.38 4.53 3.67 3.57 3.24 
Tobacco Products 8.29 8.07 7.95 6.74 6.74 6.57 5.90 5.58 
Minerals and ores 8.38 8.68 7.18 6.66 6.24 5.99 5.76 6.24 
Petroleum Products 13.93 12.39 22.46 29.56 32.91 38.32 40.37 40.99 
Chemicals 11.15 14.42 11.14 9.79 10.17 9.86 9.31 8.86 
Plastics and articles thereof 2.50 4.04 4.21 3.66 2.28 2.38 2.39 2.52 
Rubber products 4.93 4.62 2.90 2.65 2.16 1.96 1.79 1.27 
Leather and wood products 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.15 
Textiles and garments 10.78 8.54 6.25 5.20 4.84 4.68 4.62 3.73 
Basic metals 9.62 14.53 11.43 11.15 10.42 9.18 9.84 11.24 
Electrical and electronic  
  goods/tools 
16.11 11.88 10.47 9.47 8.81 8.18 7.77 7.82 
Transport vehicles 8.39 7.35 8.46 8.79 8.90 7.17 6.97 6.63 
Miscellaneous 1.35 1.51 2.51 1.76 1.81 1.88 1.57 1.73 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
  Source: Central Board of Excise and Customs, Ministry of Finance, Government of 
India. 
 
 A striking feature of CenVAT collections is that, like in the case of corporation 
tax, a predominant proportion is paid by public-sector enterprises. The contribution of the 
public sector to total excise collections in 2002-03 was about 42 percent (Table 3.10). It 
is also seen that there are wide fluctuations in the share from year to year. The 
fluctuations are mainly due to the fluctuations in administered prices on items such as 
steel, coal, and petroleum products. In other words, the revenue from CenVAT is 




The most important and in many ways far-reaching reforms were in the case of customs 
tariffs. Since 1991, imports subject to quantitative restrictions constituted 90 percent of 
total imports, and these restrictions have been virtually done away with. The import 
weighted tariff rates have been reduced from 72 percent in 1990 to 15 percent at present. 
The peak rate of import duty too has been brought down from over 150 percent in 1991 
to less than 20 percent at present (Virmani et al. 2004). 
 A major problem from the viewpoint of efficiency is the continuation of 
differentiated tax rates varying with the stage of production. The rates on raw materials 
and intermediate goods continue to be lower than those on consumer goods and capital 
goods. The import tariff reduction has continued to be guided by this “unprincipled 
principle” (Joshi and Little 1996), and even the Kelkar Task Force on indirect taxes has 
suggested that the rate differentiation should be made on the basis of the stage of 
production. This approach retains the focus on greater protection for final-use industries 
as compared to inputs and intermediate goods, and a continued reliance on the self-
sufficiency model of development as against a comparative advantage model. 
 
Table 3.10. Contribution of PSEs to Excise  Revenues of GOI 
 
 Public enterprises Total collections Share of PSEs 
1990-91 9655.69 24514 39.39 
1991-92 9815.15 28110 34.92 
1992-93 12179.9 30832 39.50 
1993-94 12527.11 31697 39.52 
1994-95 16414.07 37347 43.95 
1995-96 17044.41 40187 42.41 
1996-97 22192.87 45008 49.31 
1997-98 21719.61 47962 45.29 
1998-99 23131.67 53246 43.44 
1999-00 32941.53 61902 53.22 
2000-01 20824.38 68526 30.39 
2001-02 31202.78 72555 43.01 
2002-03 34610.32 82310 42.05 
 
  Sources: Public Enterprises Survey Various Issues, and Budget of GOI, various years. 
  Notes: Tax Provision relates to the provision made for Corporate Tax. 
 
 Table 3.11 presents customs collections by commodity group from 1990-91 to 
2003-04.  Interestingly, despite significant external liberalisation, almost 60 percent of 
the duty is collected from just three commodity groups – namely, machinery (26.6 
percent), petroleum products (21 percent), and chemicals (11 percent). Furthermore, the 
overwhelming proportion (over 75 percent) of the duty is collected from either machinery 
or basic inputs and intermediate goods. Thus, contrary to some fears, liberalization has 
not led to a massive inflow of consumer goods. This also implies that further reduction in 
duties and greater uniformity in the structure of duties would have beneficial effects on 
the economy. A detailed econometric study of Virmani et al. (2004) shows that a uniform 
reduction in tariffs has had favorable effects on production, exports, employment, and 
capital, and that these gains are different across different sectors.  
 The commodity group composition of import duties also shows a significant 
increase in the proportion of import duties collected from machinery from 19.5 percent in 
1990-91 to 26.6 percent in 2003-04. This has happened despite providing exemption to 
the plant and machinery imported for several project imports. This implies that external 
liberalization is leading to adoption of more modern machinery and technology in the 
production process, which would have a favorable effect on productivity growth. The 
other item that has shown an increase in revenue importance is food products. In contrast, 
revenue from iron and steel and other basic metals has shown a substantial decline over 
the years. This may be due to the fact that these items have become more competitive 
and, therefore, it is perhaps more attractive to buy them in the domestic market rather 
than to import them.  
 
Table 3.11. Composition of Revenue from Customs Duties 
(Percent) 
 
 1990-91 1995-96 1996-97 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Food items 2.49 2.43 2.25 5.42 10.64 8.76 6.36 
Tea/coffee 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.04 
Beverages 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.16 0.10 
Minerals and ores 1.38 0.74 0.52 1.34 1.55 1.80 1.74 
Petroleum products 19.39 23.39 28.54 23.16 16.14 19.50 20.93 
Chemicals 12.34 11.86 11.19 10.35 11.41 11.19 11.12 
  of which:  
  Pharmaceutical 
    products 
0.06 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.30 0.44 0.29 
Plastics 6.36 4.86 4.71 2.99 3.14 3.07 3.10 
Rubber 1.38 1.32 1.48 1.39 1.40 1.30 1.33 
Paper 1.04 0.65 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.89 
Textiles 2.16 1.26 0.94 0.97 0.85 0.96 1.40 
Cement products etc. 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.26 
Ceramics 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.69 0.78 0.75 0.98 
Iron and steel 10.24 6.63 5.15 3.81 3.78 3.72 4.64 
Other basic metals 4.28 4.95 4.38 2.12 2.30 2.17 2.50 
Machinery 19.49 20.84 18.81 23.55 24.80 26.36 26.58 
Transport equipment 3.29 4.04 4.69 3.94 3.96 3.37 4.14 
Others  15.20 16.16 15.90 19.25 18.06 15.87 13.90 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 




Towards Further Reforms in the Tax System 
 
In the last few years, reforming the central tax system has received considerable 
attention. Several reports have comprehensively examined the tax system and made 
important recommendations for reform (India 2001a, 2002, 2004). While there are 
differences related to some of the specific recommendations as compared to the TRC, 
there is broad agreement on the direction and thrust of reforms and on the emphasis 
placed on the reform of tax administration.   
 
Reform of Central Taxes 
 
The reforms with regard to personal income tax will involve further simplification of the 
tax system. This includes withdrawal of tax exemptions and concessions given for 
specified activities, abolition of surcharge and further simplification of the tax. In fact, 
there is considerable virtue in having a single tax rate with an exemption limit, as many 
transitional economies have found. The ability of an income tax system to bring about 
significant redistribution is limited, and it is increasingly being realized that equity should 
focus on increasing the incomes of the poor rather than on reducing the incomes of the 
rich. This objective is better achieved by expenditures on human development and not 
through the tax system (Bird and Zolt, 2005). Yet, moving towards a single rate of tax 
may not be politically feasible at this juncture. 
 On the corporation tax, base broadening involves getting rid of tax preferences. In 
particular, the exemption for profits from exports, special economic and free trade zones, 
technology parks, area-based exemptions for backward area development and for 
infrastructure should be phased out. Similarly, the present rate of depreciation allowance, 
even after the reduction in 2005-06, is quite generous and needs to be reduced to more 
realistic levels. There has been a great deal of flip-flop in regard to the taxation of 
dividends from one year to another. The most satisfactory solution in this regard is to 
partially integrate the tax with the personal income tax.  
 With regard to import duties, the reform will have to move in the direction of 
further reduction and the unification of rates. As most non-agricultural tariffs fall 
between zero and 15 percent, a uniform tariff of 10 percent would considerably simplify 
and rationalize the systems (Acharya 2005). Equally important is the need to get rid of 
the plethora of exemptions and concessional treatment to various categories, which 
include project imports. In fact, a minimum tariff of 5 percent on all exempted items 
would rationalize the duty structure and would increase revenue as well. 
 Wide-ranging exemptions are also a problem with excise duties. In particular, the 
exemptions given to small scale industry have not only eroded the tax base but have 
inhibited the growth of firms into an economic scale. Similarly, various exemptions given 
to project imports have significantly eroded the tax base. Another important reform area 
is to integrate fully the CENVAT with the taxation of services (India 2001b). 
 
Evolving a Coordinated Consumption Tax System 
 
One of the most important reforms needed in an indirect tax system is the development of 
a coordinated consumption tax system for the country (Rao 1998). This is necessary to 
ensure that the tax burden is distributed fairly between different sectors and between 
goods and services. The reform should also improve the revenue productivity, minimize 
relative price distortions and above all, ensure a common market in the country.  
 This involves coordinated calibration of reforms at central, state and local levels. 
At the center, as mentioned above, the first step is to evolve a manufacturing stage VAT 
on goods and services. At the state level, converting the sales tax into VAT should be 
completed by allowing input tax credit not only for intrastate sales and purchases but also 
for interstate transactions. Also, appropriate mechanisms must be found in order to enable 
the states to levy the tax on services and to integrate it with the VAT on goods, so as to 
arrive at a comprehensive VAT. An important problem in this regard is devising a system 
for taxation of services with an interstate coverage.   
 The local level indirect tax reform relates to finding a suitable substitute for 
octroi. While most states in India have abolished octroi, this process has made the local 
bodies dependent on the state government for revenues. In every country, property tax is 
a mainstay of local body finances; reform in this area should help in raising revenue 
productivity. Yet, this may not suffice. In this situation, the better option is to allow local 
bodies to piggyback on the VAT collections in urban local body jurisdictions. This will 
avoid cascading of the tax and minimize exportation of the tax burden by urban local 





Reform in Tax Administration 
 
In India, the poor state of tax administration has been a major reason for low levels of 
compliance and high compliance costs. This is due in part to the virtual absence of data 
on both direct and indirect taxes even at the central level. Not only does this hinder 
proper analysis of taxes needed to provide an adequate, analytical background to calibrate 
changes in the tax structure, but it also makes proper enforcement of the tax difficult. 
Thus the changes in the tax structure had to be made in an ad hoc manner.  
 The consequence of this ad hoc manner has been high compliance costs. The only 
estimate of compliance costs by Das-Gupta (2004a, 2004b) shows that in the case of 
personal income tax, it is as high as 49 percent of the collections from the tax. In the case 
of corporate tax, it is between 6 and 15 percent of the tax paid; much of these costs arise 
from legal costs of compliance. While these estimates should be taken with a note of 
caution, it is important to note that the compliance cost of taxes in India is extremely 
high.   
 High compliance costs combined with poor state information system has led to 
continued interface of taxpayers with officials, negotiated payment of taxes, corruption 
and rent seeking, and low levels of tax compliance. An important indication of the poor 
information system is that even as the coverage of TDS was extended over the years, 
information was not assembled even to check whether those deducting the tax at source 
actually filed the returns. As the CAG report for 2003-04 states, of the 0.63 million 
returns to be filed by TDS assessees, only 0.50 million were filed. Thus, more than 40 
percent of the TDS assessees did not file the returns. Even this is a vast improvement 
over the previous year when 80 percent of the TDS assessees did not file the returns.  
 The recent initiatives on building the computerized information system in direct 
taxes follow from the recommendations of the KTF. The Central Board of Direct Taxes 
(CBDT) outsourced the function of issuing permanent account numbers (PAN). The Tax 
Information Network (TIN) has been established by the National Securities Depository 
Limited (NSDL). The initial phase has focused on ensuring that TDS assessees do in fact 
file the returns, as well as on matching and cross-checking the information from banking 
and financial institutions to ensure that the taxes paid according to the returns are credited 
into government accounts in the banks. The Online Tax Accounting System (OLTAS) 
was operationalized in July 2004. This has helped expedite the number of refunds from 
2.6 million in 2002-03 to 5.6 million in 2003-04. Not surprisingly, in the last four years, 
revenue from direct taxes increased at over 20 percent per year. 
 Similar initiatives have been taken in regard to indirect taxes as well. The customs 
e-commerce gateway (ICEGATE) and Customs Electronic Data Interchange System 
(ICES) have helped to improve the information system and speed up the clearance 
processes. In 2003-04, ICES handled about 4 million declarations in automated customs 
locations which constituted about 75 percent of India’s international trade. Progress has 
been made in building capacity in modern audit systems and computerized risk 
assessment with assistance from the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA).  
 Another critical element in tax administration is the networking of the information 
from various sources. As mentioned earlier, to improve tax enforcement, systems must be 
developed in order to put together information received from various sources to quantify 
the possible tax implications in a judicially acceptable manner. In the first instance, the 
information networking should obtain data from various sources such as banks and 
financial institutions on various assessees. In the second, there must be meaningful 
exchange of information between the direct and indirect tax administrations. In the third, 
it is necessary to exchange information between central and state taxes. Building 






1 We would like to thank Professor Roger Gordon for detailed comments on the draft of 
the paper. 
2 Section 32A and 32AB of the Income Tax Act include the provisions for investment 
allowances while section 32 provides the accelerated depreciation provisions.  
3 The standard deduction was a provision maintained to neutralize the tax disadvantage 
that a salaried taxpayer faced. While a self-employed taxpayer is entitled to deduct all his 
expenses towards earning the income as costs, there is no such provision for the salaried. 
The standard deduction was meant to address this concern. 
4 Under this, a contribution to the saving plan is deductible from gross taxable income 
and the income from a savings plan is also exempt from the tax. However, the withdrawal 
of savings and the benefits from it in the form of interest and dividends are subject to tax. 
This is also known as consumption taxation of savings. 
 
 
5 The change in 1997-98 was introduced with the objective for the stated purpose of 
encouraging plough back of profits by companies in place of distribution of dividends. 
However since a 10 percent tax on dividends and higher taxes in interest income was 
perceived to be an anomaly, the rate was increased to 20 percent in 2001-02. In 2002-03, 
the income was to be taxed in the hands of the recipients, so that the inequities built into a 
uniform tax are reduced. There was withholding provisions of 10 percent – recipients in 
higher tax brackets could claim credit for this amount. It should be mentioned that some 
withholding provisions were always in place whenever the tax was payable by the 
recipient. However, these were at the rates equivalent to the lowest income tax slab 
prevalent at the time. 
6 The tax credit in subsequent years is available for amounts over and above the MAT 
payable in that year. In other words, in every financial year, any given firm is expected to 
pay at least the minimum alternate tax.  
7 This was discontinued in the 2006-07 budget. 
8 The budget for 2006-07 expands the scope further to include an additional fifteen 
categories of services. 
9 It may be mentioned that there are two separate levies on sale of goods – a CenVAT 
levied and collected by the central government and a state VAT levied and collected by 
the state governments. As discussed above, the former applies only on manufacture of 
goods and allows for tax credit to flow between this tax and service tax. In the states, the 
levy applies on sale of goods alone.  
 
 
10 Whether reimbursement of medical expenses or contributions to pension funds should 
be considered “preferences” is a debatable issue. In the context of India, the extent of 
deductions on these counts are limited and prescribed by the Income Tax Act. For 
instance, all reimbursements of medical expenses upto Rs 15000 per annum per 
employee are deductible from taxable income, but for expenses beyond this limit, the rest 
is considered a part of taxable income. This therefore does not provide a rational basis for 
treatment of medical expenses. Further, this option is available only to salaried 
employees not to self employed individuals. In the case of contributions to pension funds 
too, the limit is Rs 10,000. Contributions beyond this level are from tax paid incomes.  
11 "Exempt-exempt-exempt" refers to a form of treatment where the incomes if saved are 
not subject to a tax, the income on these savings, i.e., interest or dividend, when it accrues 
is not taxes, nor is it taxed when it is withdrawn from savings and consumed. 
12 Since the MAT meant that a lot of the other preferences accorded in the tax statute like 
accelerated depreciation. 
13 The Act defines ‘fringe benefits’ to mean any privilege, service, facility, or amenity, 
directly or indirectly, provided by an employer to an employee by reason of his 
employment, or any reimbursement made by an employer directly or indirectly for any 
purpose, or any free or concessional travel ticket for private journeys, or any contribution 
by an employer towards an approved superannuation fund. 
14 While in principle, duty drawback for exports would not be considered an incentive, 
when the form of the scheme does not maintain a clear link between the extent of duty 
suffered by the exported good and the duty drawback offered, the scheme takes on the 
 
 
form of a tax preference. In India, the drawback rates are specified by law on the basis of 
industry averages of inputs used and not on the basis of invoices for taxes paid.  
15 A similar system is already in place in India for supporting the tracking of inter-state 
sales for taxation under the central sales tax Act. This system requires the importer to 
provide documentary evidence of being a taxpayer in the importing state in order to avail 
the lower rate of tax. An alternative mechanism could be one where the importer declares 
upfront to the tax department, the details of the consignment intended for import from 
another state and this information is used by the exporting state to provide the exporting 
dealer with zero-rating.  
16 Effective tax rates are derived by applying the tax structure to reference income levels. 
Given the limited sample size, such an exercise would not be empirically sound and 
hence is not reported. 
17 A business house has been used in Prowess to include all companies where one entity 
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